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NOTES
FROM SNAIL MAIL TO E-MAIL: THE
STEADY EVOLUTION OF SERVICE OF
PROCESS
JOHN M. MURPHY 111*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the Internet has become a significant part of the
everyday life of many Americans.1 Their daily routine includes
using electronic mail, otherwise known as e-mail, allowing people
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2005; B.S.E. Chemical
Engineering, University of Notre Dame, May 2002. The author would like to thank his
parents and family for all of their love and support, the entire staff of the Journal of Legal
Commentary for all of their hard work, and Julie for always being by his side.
1 See Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 191-98 (2003) (discussing growth of Internet
use). See generally Jacquelyn Trussell, Note, Is the CAN-SPAM Act the Answer to the
Growing Problem of Spam?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 175, 175-77 (2004) (referring to
issues between Internet and society); Paul Taylor, Dawning of the Information Age, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 1997, at 3 (explaining rise in Internet use in last 15 years, with
adults between ages 18-35 watching less television in order to dedicate time to browsing
Internet).
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to send messages to each other from across the globe just by
clicking a button on their computer. 2 In fact, the primary reason
people use the Internet is to write and receive e-mail:
approximately 1.6 billion non-commercial e-mails were sent out
daily in the United States at the turn of the century. 3 Arguably,
international use of e-mail may be much greater.4 In recent
years, e-mails have constituted major pieces of evidence in
litigation, and as a result, were important in recent cases. 5
Consequently, there have been increasingly more cases where e-
mail has played a significant role in determining the relevant
issues. 6
The increasing use of e-mail has reached the federal court
system, evidenced by the establishment of an efficient intranet
system in 1999 which allows for expeditious e-mail
communications between persons within the federal system and
the ability to view time-sensitive materials. 7 Indeed, in 2001, a
2 See John Shors, The Peril of E-Mail, Bus. REC., Mar. 2, 1998, at 10 (stating that
average worker with Internet access received 25-50 e-mails per day and spent up to two
hours deciphering and responding to them); see also Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild
Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for
Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 176
(2000) (concluding prevalence of computers in society produces more information, both at
home and work, from computer programs, Internet, and e-mail). See generally
Loudenslager, supra note 1, at 191-94 (highlighting implications of e-mail).
3 See Trussell, supra note 1, at 176 (citing statistics on use of e-mail); see also Frank
Conley, Comment, :-) Service With a Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and Other Electronic
Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 407, 414-15 (1997)
(discussing e-mail traffic). See generally Reid Goldsborough, You've Got E-Mail,
CONSUMERS' RES. MAG., Jan. 1, 2000 (discussing low cost of using e-mail and its
continued growth nationwide).
4 See Samuel A. Thumma & Darrel S. Jackson, The History of Electronic Mail in
Litigation, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1999) (estimating
number of domestic and international e-mail users); see also Conley, supra note 3, at 414
(stating that "over forty million people use the Internet worldwide"). See generally
Trussell, supra note 1, at 179-80 (discussing spam in international e-mail).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(listing purported admissions and other evidence contained in Microsoft's internal e-mail);
see also Thumma & Jackson, supra note 4, at 3-4 (examining cases where problems arose
for parties due to permanence of inflammatory and inculpating e-mails). See generally
Galves, supra note 2, at 177-93 (discussing use of computers in courtroom).
6 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d at 73 (referring to e-mail evidence); see also
Thumma & Jackson, supra note 4, at 3-5 (summarizing role of e-mail in recent litigation,
including as substantive evidence). See generally Conley, supra note 3, at 415-18
(outlining use of e-mail in litigation).
7 See William H. Rehnquist, The 1999 Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 32
The Third Branch 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/janOOttb
/jan2000.html (explaining introduction of redesigned 'J-net' intranet system) (last visited
Aug. 23, 2004); see also Lawrence W. Newman, Service Through the Internet, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 3 (describing technological developments made within federal
infrastructure for improving communications). See generally Roger A. Hanson, Note on the
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new electronic case filing system was introduced in some
bankruptcy courts which, among other things, provided for the
ability to send and view documents electronically.8 The purpose
of this system is to help with case management by reducing the
volume of paper records and making case files more accessible. 9
This system was expanded in 2002 to appellate and district
courts and currently provides both a new case management
system and an ability to manage electronic filings.' 0 There have
also been innovations in a new national e-mail system, including
security features allowing only the intended recipient to read the
e-mail message." Issues surrounding the implementation of
these systems have included the balancing of public usefulness
with the need for privacy in guaranteeing that these electronic
documents are viewed only by those so intended.12 Overall, the
federal judiciary has taken great steps forward in using the
Impact of Technology on Appellate Caseflow Management, 35 IND. L. REV. 527, app. at
527-37 (2002) (examining implications of technology in appellate courts).
8 See William H. Rehnquist, The 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 34
The Third Branch (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan02ttb/janO2.html
(reviewing introduction of new, experimental procedures in bankruptcy courts aiming to
expedite filing process) (last visited Aug. 23, 2004). See generally Jeanne Finegan, The
Web Offers Near, Real-Time Cost-Efficient Notice, 2003 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1-7 (2003)
(discussing case filing system of U.S. bankruptcy courts); Donald F. Walton, Entering the
21st Century: Some Views on Electronic Case Filing from the U.S. Trustee's Perspective,
2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1-11 (2002) (analyzing electronic case filing system in
bankruptcy courts).
9 See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan02ttb/jan02.html
(discussing changes in bankruptcy court processes). See generally Finegan, supra note 8,
at 1-7 (discussing use of electronic case filing); Walton, supra note 8, at 1-11 (examining
use of electronic case filing).
10 See William H. Rehnquist, The 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 35
The Third Branch (2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan03ttb/janO3.html
(addressing implementation of new electronic case management systems in several levels
of federal court system) (last visited Aug. 23, 2004); see also Hanson, supra note 7, at 527-
37 (describing enhanced appellate court performance resulting from enhanced court
technology). See generally Walton, supra note 8, at 1-11 (discussing use of electronic case
filing in Administrative Office of U.S. Courts).
11 See Rehnquist, supra note 10, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan03ttb
/jan03.html (citing new national e-mail system that carries special encryptions to ensure
that only intended recipients will read e-mail) (last visited Aug. 23, 2004); see also Larry
Bick, Is Electronic Filing in Your Future?, 2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1-7 (2002)
(explaining security measures in electronic court filing systems). See generally Miriam J.
Metzger & Sharon Docter, Public Opinion and Policy Initiatives for Online Privacy
Protection, J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA, Sept. 1, 2003, at 1 (discussing online privacy and
security).
12 See Rehnquist, supra note 8, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jan02ttb/jan02.html
(last visited Aug. 23, 2004) (weighing privacy issues in finding that electronic court filing
system should not be implemented in criminal cases); see also Metzger & Docter, supra
note 11, at 2 (analyzing issues of pubic concern with security in online transactions). See
generally Bick, supra note 11, at 4-5 (discussing security concerns in electronic case
filing).
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latest technology to improve the efficiency of the court's filing
system.13
One of these technological steps forward has been to allow
service of process upon defendants via electronic means,
specifically via e-mail, in certain situations.14 This Note will
examine the evolution of service of process that has led to the
acceptance of service via e-mail. Part II will discuss the history
of service of process and its evolution from personal service in
Pennoyer to service by publication in Mullane. Part III will
consider service of process via newer technologies which were not
contemplated under Mullane. Part IV will then review separate
developments in the federal and state systems involving
electronic filings, including the FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 5. Part V will examine service of process via e-mail
as elaborated by the Ninth Circuit in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio
International Interlink. It will also examine procedural rules
such as FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(f) and The Hague
Service Convention to further see which direction the law will
develop.
This Note concludes that service of process via e-mail has been
the natural response to the technological evolution and can be
the most expedient method of maintaining justice where it is
necessary. The concept of service of process has continuously
evolved with technology. Courts have permitted service by
electronic means only in limited circumstances and always where
consistent with the 'reasonably calculated' standard of Mullane
because there needs to be a well-defined limit to the doctrine to
ensure that due process requirements are met.
13 See Rehnquist, supra note 10, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/janO3ttb/janO3.html
(updating status of technological improvements in federal system) (last visited Aug. 23,
2004); Rehnquist, supra note 8, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/janO2ttb/janO2.html
(introducing new technologies used to help case management in certain federal districts)
(last visited Aug. 23, 2004); Rehnquist, supra note 7, at http://www.uscourts.govlttb/
jan0Ottb/jan2000.html (discussing improved intranet system in federal courts) (last
visited Aug. 23, 2004).
14 See, e.g., Finegan, supra note 8, 1-7 (citing instance where court gave permission to
electronically serve notice of court filings); see also Newman, supra note 7, at 1
(explaining various court responses to electronic service of process). See generally Conley,
supra note 3, 402-25 (discussing e-mail's effect on service of process).
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Generally, while the purpose of service of process is to notify
parties of a pending lawsuit,15 both personal jurisdiction and
service of process are required for a court to extend its authority
over a defendant.16 In Pennoyer v. Neff,17 the Court adopted the
prevailing nineteenth century view that personal jurisdiction was
territorial.' 8 It recognized that a basis for personal jurisdiction
was best established by serving process on a party within the
territorial borders of a forum,19 but also held that personal
service of notice of an impending lawsuit need not be made
within the boundaries of the forum so long as the defendant held
property within those boundaries. 20
As the country expanded, this view became impractical and
unable to satisfy the requirements of due process. 21 By 1917, in
15 See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
1094 (3d ed. 2002) (noting courts generally hold that service of process is required to "give
the defendant notice of the institution of the proceedings"); see also Jeremy A. Colby,
You've Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 337, 339 (2003) (reviewing personal jurisdiction as precursor to service of
process). See generally Conley, supra note 3, at 411-12 (analyzing procedural rules of
process service).
16 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(requiring both personal jurisdiction and service of process in order for courts to claim
authority over parties); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
350 (1999) (holding that courts may not exercise power over defendants without service of
process); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 340 (comparing modern standards of personal
jurisdiction to nineteenth century standards).
17 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
18 See James Wm. Moore, et al., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 108.01(2)(c) (3d ed.
1997) (explaining that, under Pennoyer standard, a party's presence within a forum was
prerequisite for existence of personal jurisdiction); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 340
(discussing conceptions of personal jurisdiction in nineteenth century); Conley, supra note
3, at 419-20 (discussing basis for Pennoyer holding).
19 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725-26 (describing differences between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction, noting that rigid territorial requirements were necessary for
personal jurisdiction); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 340-41 (outlining framework of
personal jurisdiction and service of process beginning with Pennoyer); Conley, supra note
3, at 419-20 (quoting Pennoyer).
20 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727 (explaining that personal service was not required
where defendant held property in forum state because it was believed that a person was
always in possession of his property and that seizure would inform party of impending
action); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 340-41 (reviewing rule extracted from Pennoyer);
Conley, supra note 3, at 419-20 (referring to court's analysis in Pennoyer).
21 See Conley, supra note 3, at 418-19 (noting changes enacted to meet evolving
needs of increasingly nationally-focused, as opposed to locally- or regionally-focused,
country); see also Colby supra note 15, at 341 (stating that anachronistic standards
adopted under Pennoyer were reformulated to meet needs of mobile society). See generally
Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe's Half-Buried Legacy,
28 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 561, 567 (1995) (discussing service of process requirements after
Pennoyer).
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McDonald v. Mabee,22 the Court began to recognize that other
forms of personal service were required by due process. 23 There,
Justice Holmes stated, "To dispense with personal service the
substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least
that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done."24
Shortly after this case, the state of Ohio enacted a statute
permitting the court to authorize service through the mail.25
Personal jurisdiction requirements were becoming less stringent
as the territorial nexus for personal jurisdiction became
deemphasized to properly establish personal jurisdiction. 26 An
example of this is seen in Hess v. Pawloski,27 where the Court
created what amounts to a legal fiction to establish personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident motorist rather than vacate the
in-state jurisdictional requirement completely. 28  The
constitutional basis for Pennoyer was noticeably kept in place,
22 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (voiding Texas statute which allowed service by publication in
newspaper after defendant's final departure from state).
23 See McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91-93 (inferring that service of process via local
publication could be proper where party intended to return to that locality despite holding
such as improper under case facts); see also Conley, supra note 3, at 418 (citing McDonald
as starting point of Supreme Court's trend in recognizing other methods of service). See
generally Christopher D. Cameron, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome
Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 811 (1995)
(analyzing modern service of process in light of McDonald).
24 McDonald, 243 U.S. at 92 (arguing that substituted service must be method most
likely to reach party).
25 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4.1 (Banks-Baldwin 1996) (granting Ohio courts option
to supplement in personam service with service by mail by 1919); see also Conley, supra
note 3, at 419 (discussing development of service of process by mail). See generally Yvonne
A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: E-Mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C. L. REV.
227, 236 (2000) (examining service of process via mail).
26 See Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the
Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1171-72 (2003) (elaborating on
evolution of personal jurisdiction from territorial-based personal jurisdiction to flexible
minimum contacts-based standard); see also Tamayo, supra note 25, at 236 (relating
substituted service standards). See generally Courtney Pilkinton Gilbert, State Office of
Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell: An Examination of Arkansas' Substituted Service
Provision, 53 ARK. L. REV. 131, 142-51 (2000) (analyzing benefits and drawbacks of
substituted service).
27 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (finding that personal jurisdiction exists where state exercises
jurisdiction over non-resident motorists using their highways).
28 See Hess, 274 U.S. at 353-57 (empowering states to declare that use of highways
by non-residents was equivalent to appointment of registrar as agent upon whom process
could be served to establish personal jurisdiction); see also Taylor, supra note 26, at 1171-
72 (analyzing how service of process doctrine had evolved between Pennoyer and Int'l
Shoe). See generally Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent
Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 108 (1992) (evaluating
Hess' impact on personal jurisdiction).
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but the Court slowly began to expand its notion of personal
jurisdiction.29
Nearly thirty years after Pennoyer, in International Shoe v.
Washington,30 the Court articulated this expanded notion of
alternative forms of service when it permitted personal
jurisdiction over a defendant wherever there existed "minimum
contacts" between the party and the forum state.31 Speaking for
the Court, Justice Stone stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.32
The Court also noted that a substituted form of service, as was
used here, would be adequate service where it "gives reasonable
assurance that the notice will be actual."33 The Court finally held
that service of process by mail here was sufficient notice of the
impending lawsuit on a defendant over whom the court had
jurisdiction via his "systematic and continuous" business contacts
within the state.34 Service of process, it can be said, had evolved
29 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 1171-73 (mentioning Supreme Court's persistence in
asserting that Pennoyer's standard, under which personal jurisdiction was to be
examined, remained useful even after Int'l Shoe); see also Douglas A. Mays, Note,
Burnham v. Superior Court: The Supreme Court Agrees on Transient Jurisdiction in
Practice, But Not in Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1991) (noting transient
jurisdiction standard remains viable following Int'l Shoe). See generally Friedrich K.
Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1035 (1995)
(commenting on Pennoyer's continued authority).
30 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that due process requires only that defendants have
minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit "does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
31 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (recognizing that personal jurisdiction exists when
minimum contacts within forum are established); see also Juenger, supra note 29, at 1030
(explaining Int'l Shoe's impact on Pennoyer's authority). See generally Mays, supra note
29, at 1272 (explaining how service of process expanded beyond unbending territorial
limits following Int' Shoe).
32 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (recognizing that personal jurisdiction exists when
minimum contacts within forum are established).
33 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320; Colby, supra note 15, at 343-44 (comparing substantive
and procedural requirements of personal service, and determining the standard under
which courts must issue notice for suit to be effective).
34 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320 (validating personal service of notice by mail where
defendant was under personal jurisdiction of courts after satisfying minimum contacts
test); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 343-44 (describing Court's holding, stating that
service of notice via mail had been well established by 1945). See generally Tamayo, supra
20041
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from a rigid, territorial standard under Pennoyer to a much more
flexible approach under International Shoe.35
The concepts of service of process and personal jurisdiction
became more and more flexible as more time passed.36 In
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank,37 the Court permitted service
of process by newspaper publication on the unknown
beneficiaries of a trust fund with unknown addresses. 38 While
the Court did admit a strong preference for personal service of
written notice, it nonetheless admitted that other forms of notice
could be permitted in certain circumstances. 39 To that point,
Justice Jackson stated, "An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."40 The Court did note that in the odd particular
situation where no method of service would satisfy this
'reasonably calculated' standard, parties need only resort to some
note 25, at 230 (citing Int'l Shoe as source for relaxing requirement of physical presence in
forum state and allowing service of process by mail).
35 See Colby, supra note 15, at 344 (explaining evolution of doctrine from Pennoyer to
Int'l Shoe); see also Conley, supra note 3, at 419 (noting that doctrine of Pennoyer had
begun to evolve). See generally Tamayo, supra note 25, at 230 (stating that "[iun [Int'l
Shoe] the United States Supreme Court relaxed the physical presence standard
enunciated in Pennoyer").
36 See William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
599, 624 (1993) (discussing evolution of personal jurisdiction and 'stream of commerce'
theory of minimum contacts); see also Cappalli, supra note 28, at 158 (criticizing
amorphous and flexible modern process standard). See generally David G. Thomas,
Personal Jurisdiction in the Nebulous Regions of Cyberspace: A Call for the Continued
Relaxation of Due Process and Another Debilitating Blow to Territorial Jurisdiction, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 507, 513 (1997) (addressing problems with flexible modern service of
process standard).
37 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (striking down New York notice statute as inadequate because
it did not provide for means of contacting those who could easily be informed by other
methods).
38 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (holding that service of process via newspaper was
adequate where not all addresses of beneficiaries were known); see also Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (citing Mullane as controlling when confronted
with questions regarding adequate service of process methods). But see Willingway Hosp.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 870 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Ga. 1994) (criticizing Mullane
standard as abandoning procedural due process).
39 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14 (recognizing that certain situations may require
other methods of service of process than just written, personal service); see also Aaron R.
Chacker, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 597, 601-02 (2003) (remarking that Court's holding in Mullane expanded methods of
service).
40 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
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form of service of process 'not substantially less likely' to provide
notice than any other method of service of process. 41
Indeed, the purpose of the Court's holding was not to restrict
the possible methods of service of process, but to ensure that the
goal of service of process was met. 42 As Justice Holmes stated,
"the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience...
the substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be
convenient."43 In sum, the fungible concept of service of process
evolved as the Court established the modern standard for
determining the constitutionality of service of process.44
III. THE EVOLUTION INTO FURTHER TECHNOLOGIES
Mullane provided the constitutional framework for proper
notice.45 As technological capabilities have grown, and modern
litigants have sought to use these new technologies to effectuate
notice, Mullane has continued to provide the standard under
which this service has been permitted. 46 A brief examination of
41 See id. at 315, 317 (reconciling situations where 'reasonably calculated' standard
could not be met); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 602 (delineating exceptions and
nuances of 'reasonably calculated' standard under Mullane). See generally Orlee Goldfeld,
Note, Rule 45(B): Ambiguity in Federal Subpoena Service, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1065, 1085
(1999) (discussing notice requirement set forth under Mullane).
42 See Conley, supra note 3, at 420 (articulating purpose of Mullane as ensuring
proper notice to meet requirements of due process); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 344-
45 (stating that Mullane requires methods of service meet that due process
requirements); Goldfeld, supra note 41, at 1085 (noting that Mullane set forth
requirements for satisfying due process in service of process).
43 Conley, supra note 3, at 420 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON
LAW 1-2 (1881)).
44 See Colby, supra note 15, at 345 (observing standard under Mullane was rationale
utilized to eventually permit service of process via e-mail); see also Craig J. Knobbe, Tenth
Circuit Surveys: Securities Law, 76 DEN. U.L. REV. 903, 904 n.10 (1999) (stating that
Mullane is "recognized as the keystone of modern philosophy regarding the notice
requirement").
45 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 604 (describing how Mullane set up the
constitutional basis under which service of notice via newer technologies has been held
proper); see also W. Alexander Burnett, Dunberry v. United States: Setting the Standard
for Adequate Notice, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 613, 626 (2003) (noting Dunberry court viewed
Mullane standard as appropriate in deciding whether method of delivery of notice used
satisfies due process requirements); Colby, supra note 15, at 345 (discussing Court's use of
Mullane for determining whether notice is adequate to meet constitutional requirements).
46 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 604 (noting that modern cases which authorize
service via new technologies have used Mullane's constitutional framework). See generally
Colby, supra note 15, at 345 (stating that Mullane sets forth the standard of
constitutionality of service concerning forms of electronic service); Jennifer Mingus, E-
Mail: A Constitutional (and Economical) Method of Transmitting Class Action Notice, 47
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some cases allowing service under newer technologies shows the
continuation of the evolution of modern service of process. 47
A. Telex
New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power
Generation and Transmission Co.48 was the first foray that
federal courts made into accepting service of process through
novel technologies.4 9 This case involved a group of American
plaintiffs who were unable to effectively serve process on
defendants due to the breakdown of relations between the United
States and Iran in the late 1970's.50 The district court ordered
service of process via telex, expanding its notion of modern
communication methods.51 In its decision, the court stated:
Courts... cannot be blind to changes and advances in
technology. No longer do we live in a world where
communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast
sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic communication via
satellite can and does provide instantaneous transmission of
notice and information. No longer must process be mailed to
a defendant's door when he can receive complete notice at an
electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door
is steel and bolted shut.5 2
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 89 (1999) (noting that Mullane dictated standards which apply to e-
mail notice).
47 See, e.g., New England Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Trans.
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. N.Y. 1980) (allowing service via telex); Calabrese v. Springer
Person. of N.Y. Inc., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (allowing service by facsimile);
In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713 (2000) (allowing electronic service of
defendant under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(0(3)).
48 495 F. Supp. 73.
49 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 604-05 (announcing that New England Merchants
is first adaptation of Mullane to newer technologies for providing adequate service of
process); see also Tamayo, supra note 25, at 248 (noting that court broke new ground by
allowing service via telex).
50 See New England Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 75-76 (observing that case was
consolidation of 89 cases with substantially similar facts and issues, noting difficult
political climate at time allowed it to be easier for defendants to avoid conventional
methods of service).
51 See id. at 81-82 (allowing plaintiffs to send text of summons, notice of suit, and
copy of pleadings via telex to defendants in both Farsi and English); see also Chacker,
supra note 39, at 606 (examining principle put forward that new methods of
communication could be effective in effectuating notice while staying within
constitutional boundaries); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 248 (explaining ground-breaking
effect of establishing new and effective means of serving process through newer and more
viable technologies).
52 New England Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81.
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This statement was a premonition of things to come, as the
concept of service of process would continue to develop with
newer technologies. 53 Although telex soon became an outdated
technology, there were a few other cases allowing service of
process via telex.5 4
B. Facsimile
After the court's ruling in New England Merchants, several
commentators began to wonder how this ruling would apply to
other technologies, such as the fax machine. 55 However, it was
many years before federal courts would speak up on the subject,
although several state rules did broach the subject.56 Despite the
dearth of case law on this subject, there have been some cases
addressing the applicability of facsimile in other procedural
contexts. 57 In Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of New York,
Inc.,58 a New York trial court looked at facsimile service of an
53 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 607 (discussing link between foreshadowing in New
England Merchants about responses to technology by courts and its actual evolution); see
also Tamayo, supra note 25, at 249 (noting that eight years after New England
Merchants, service evolved further by allowing service via fax). But see Colby, supra note
3, at 354-55 (noting that while some courts have allowed service via fax and e-mail, other
federal courts have prohibited electronic service).
54 See, e.g., Cooper v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 92 F.R.D. 783 (D. Mass. 1982)
(allowing service of process by telex where it met due process requirements); Harris Corp.
v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing New England
Merchants in finding that service of process by telex was proper).
55 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 607-08 (discussing development of expanding
service of process consistent with expansion in technology); see also Henry G. Perritt, Jr.,
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1996) (noting that possibility of service
via other electronic means, such as fax, has surfaced since New England Merchants);
David A. Sokastis, The Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process Using Fax Machines, 16
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 531, 538-54 (1990) (arguing service via fax is
reasonable and practical method for serving process upon parties and fits into
constitutional framework of Mullane and New England Merchants).
56 See e.g., IDAHO R. CIV. P. 4 (announcing that service may be transmitted by
facsimile machine or telegraph); MONT. CODE ANN. 25-3-501 (2003) (allowing any
summons, writ, or order in any civil action or proceeding and all other papers requiring
service to be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for such service in any place); UTAH R.
CIV. P. 4 (providing for service by "telegraph or telephone" before recent amendments
eliminated such service).
57 See Chacker, supra note 39, at n.62 (commenting on minimal case law discussing
service of process via e-mail but noting other cases which may be relevant in examining
service of process by electronic means); see also Perritt, supra note 55, at 33 (noting that
individual Courts of Appeal allow filing of papers via facsimile).
58 534 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (finding that service by facsimile met due
process requirements); see also Tamayo, supra note 25, at 249 (discussing Calabrese
among cases permitting service of process via newer technological approaches); Conley,
supra note 3, at 422-23 (fitting reasoning used in Calabrese into "electronic terminal"
concept stated earlier in New England Merchants).
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order to answer interrogatories. 59 The court allowed plaintiffs
attorney to fax an order to defendant's attorney which required
an answer to plaintiffs interrogatories be submitted to plaintiff
within 20 days. 60 Defendant issued concern over the fact that
service by fax did not constitute reasonable service. 61 However,
the trial judge held the service to be permissible, and in doing so
stated:
There could now ensue controversy as to whether the
recipient's office is open, whether anyone is in charge, and
whether the fax machine is in a conspicuous place. I refuse,
however, to engage in such Augustinian folly. Of course the
office is open when the fax machine is receiving. If an
operator is present, of course there is delivery. If no operator
is present, of course the fax machine, which is visited
regularly, is in a conspicuous place. 62
He would further say:
[Fax] machines have been around for many years, but
recently they have become so sophisticated and user-friendly
that they have become overwhelmingly the method of choice
for the transmission of documents in today's world. Indeed
their use has become so widespread that business stationery
now commonly carries a "fax" telephone number in addition
to an ordinary one, and, in common usage [sic], "fax" has
been converted into a verb as well as an adjective and
noun. 63
The court here held that service of papers via fax was
permissible, but Judge Lane's words could easily be applied to
other technologies, including computers and e-mail. 64
59 See Calabrese, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 84 (holding service of discovery order made by
facsimile valid).
60 See id. at 84 (employing judicial discretion allowed by law).
61 See id. at 84 (listing defendant's arguments against service via fax).
62 Id.
63 Calabrese v. Springer Pers. of N.Y., Inc., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
64 See e.g., Conley, supra note 3, at 423 (comparing current widespread use of
computers with availability of fax machines to those of fifteen years ago to demonstrate
evolution of service of process amongst technologies of fax and e-mail is smaller step);
Terry W. Posey, Jr., You've Got Service: Rio Properties, Inc. vs. Rio International
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), 28 DAYTON L. REV. 403 (2003) (arguing e-mail is
not permissible form of service of process under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3)). See generally Paul
Fasciano, Note, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last Bastion for the Mailbox Rule, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 971, 987-90 (1997) (discussing diminished importance of "mailbox rule" in light of
new technologies such as electronic mail).
SERVICE OF PROCESS BYE-MAIL
A federal court would finally speak on the subject of electronic
service of process by facsimile in In re International Telemedia
Associates, Inc. 65 In this bankruptcy case, the plaintiff moved to
serve his complaint on Diaz, a foreign defendant, by electronic
means under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(f)(3).66
These electronic means included transmission by facsimile and e-
mail. 67 The defendant, Diaz, had refused to provide a permanent
street address to plaintiff, instead only giving him a permanent
fax number and an e-mail address for all further
communication. 68 The court summarized plaintiffs need for
alternative methods of service by saying, "despite diligent efforts,
the Trustee is left without any feasible methods for contacting
Diaz except by facsimile transmission and electronic mail, Diaz's
preferred methods of communication, and by mail to Diaz's last
known address." 69 The court thus allowed plaintiff to serve
process on the defendant electronically, by e-mail and facsimile,
noting that the defendant preferred communication through
electronic means. 70 The court echoed the sentiment from New
England Merchants, stating:
The federal courts are not required to turn a blind eye to
society's embracement of such technological advances ... A
defendant should not be allowed to evade service by
confining himself to modern technological methods of
communication not specifically mentioned in the Federal
Rules.... The practical reality recognized and given effect
by the New England Merchants court in 1980 applies with
65 245 B.R. 713 (2000) (holding that electronic service on defendant was permissible
under FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3)).
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (being incorporated under FED. R. OF BANKR. P. 7004 to apply
in In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.). See generally In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R.
at 715 (discussing facts leading to plaintiffs request for court approval in allowing service
electronically).
67 See In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 715 (reviewing electronic means
by which plaintiff attempted to serve foreign defendant whose whereabouts were not
exactly known).
68 See id. at 718 (showing means by which defendant tried to hide from service of
process).
69 Id. at 719 (noting that electronic service of process was only available means to
contact defendant).
70 See id. at 721-22 (stating that electronic methods by which defendant was served
were most likely to provide actual notice of impending lawsuit and met due process
requirements under Mullane); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 609-10 (explaining how
service of process was permitted by facsimile and e-mail and how due process
requirements were met).
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even greater force today. 71
The court continued to embrace the advance of service by
technology and planted the seed for service by e-mail. 72
C. State Parallels
There have also been cases in state courts that have allowed
service of process via electronic means. 73 These cases further
elaborate that judiciaries around the country are employing
technology more effectively to make case management easier and
ensure that the parties to the lawsuits are more likely to receive
proper service of process.
For example, in In re Marriage of Leisy and Miller,74 a state
court in Washington held that the statutory requirements of
personal service could be waived and service could be effectuated
by substitute means. 75 In this divorce case, plaintiff Susan Leisy
had sent several e-mail messages to defendant Bruce Miller to
discuss a matter regarding their separation and impending
divorce, which Miller received.76 In response to these e-mails and
a phone call from Leisy's attorney, Miller faxed a letter to Leisy's
attorney suggesting alternatives to divorce. 77  Miller also
responded to Leisy's e-mails, where he responded that he would
71 In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 721-22; see Chacker, supra note 39,
at 610 (highlighting how court echoed sentiment of New England Merchants in allowing
service by technological means not explicitly elaborated in procedural rules).
72 See In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 721-22 (following New England
Merchants by allowing service by electronic means where it was necessary to reach
evasive defendant); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 610 (comparing In re Int'l
Telemedia Assocs., Inc., to New England Merchants in discussing expansion in service
consistent with technological expansion).
73 See e.g., In re Marriage of Leisy and Miller, No. 49134-2-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS
3164, at *1 (2002) (affirming order which allowed service of process via e-mail where
defendant had consented to such service under Washington statute); Marolf Construction,
Inc. v. Allen's Paving Co., 154 N.C. App. 723 (2002) (permitting service of process via fax
or e-mail where parties had agreed such service was proper in prior arbitration
agreement); Modan v. Modan, 327 N.J. Super. 44 (2000) (stating that had plaintiff been
forthright about knowledge that defendant could be reached via e-mail while living
abroad, court would have allowed notice to be sent via e-mail, as well as published, to
defendant to ensure actual notice was effectuated).
74 No. 49134-2-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 3164, at *1 (2002) (finding that statutory
requirements of service could be waived in favor of alternative means).
75 See id. at *4-9 (permitting service of summons to be sent via e-mail where trial
court had ordered such service in recognition of consent by defendant).
76 See id. at *1-2 (reviewing facts leading up to trial court's allowance of service via e-
mail).
77 See id. at *2 (showing defendant's desire to remain married and avoid divorce and
his responsiveness to plaintiffs attempts at contact).
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accept service of process via mail. 78 And while he refused to
divulge his address, he did provide a fax number, e-mail address,
and post office box in Nebraska at which it would be best to
communicate with him.79 Plaintiff Leisy then got a court order
permitting service of process by mail, and even interlineating
that such service should be sent via e-mail as well.80 After Leisy
served in accordance with the court's order, the trial court
dismissed Miller's motion for lack or proper service.8 1 The
appellate court found that Miller's argument that the means of
service did not comply with the state statute82 was irrelevant
since he had consented to service by mail.83 And while the court
ignores the specific argument that the service by e-mail itself was
proper,8 4 it implies in its logical argument that it may have been
proper since it was a means to which Miller stated he would
consent to service in his letter to Leisy's attorney.8 5
Another example of a case where alternative methods of
service were allowed is Marolf Construction, Inc. v. Allen's
78 See id. at *2 (stating that defendant consented to service via mail). See generally 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2002) (stating nationwide service of process by certified mail is
appropriate when serving federal officials and agencies); Colby, supra note 15, at 344
(noting courts have recognized registered mail as method of traditional legitimate service
of process).
79 See In re Marriage of Leisy, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 3164, at *2 (2002) (listing
methods by which defendant stated he preferred communication with plaintiff in his
faxed letter to plaintiffs attorney).
80 See id. at *2-3 (reviewing superior court commissioner's order to serve process
upon defendant by mail and e-mail since these methods were most likely to reach
defendant).
81 See id. at *3 (reviewing procedural history of case).
82 See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.080(16) (outlining ways process may be served); see
also In re Marriage of Leisy, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 3164, at *4 (summarizing Miller's
argument that service of process was defective under Washington state statute).
83 See In re Marriage of Leisy, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 3164, at *5 (finding that
service via mail and e-mail were valid where defendant consented to those methods of
service). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 370 (noting how parties that consent to
receiving service of process through facsimile and e-mail impliedly consent to being served
through such means); Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants,
and "ET" 73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1080 n.118 (1989) (asserting that defendants may
consent to service of process by other methods which are not enumerated in statutes).
84 See In re Marriage of Leisy, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 3164, at *8 (noting that
whether service by e-mail alone was proper or not was irrelevant).
85 See id. at *8. (noting logic of analogous situation of service to post office box, also
prohibited by statute, could be used to permit service by e-mail). See generally Colby,
supra note 15 (discussing how courts have recently permitted electronic service of process,
including telex, fax, and e-mail); Goldsmith & Rinne, supra note 83 (discussing how
defendant may consent to service of process by other methods than those enumerated in
statutes).
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Paving C0.86 There, a North Carolina appeals court held that
service of process via such means as facsimile and e-mail were
permitted since the parties had agreed to govern disagreements
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA").87 In the case, a contract dispute had arisen between the
two parties and the case manager for the AAA sent
communications about the preliminary hearing by, amongst
other methods, facsimile. 88 Respondent argued that this service
was improper and that the Uniform Arbitration Act controlled.8 9
Indeed, the statute provided, "Unless otherwise provided by the
agreement: (1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for
the hearing and cause notification to the parties to be served
personally or by registered mail not less than five days before the
hearing."90 The petitioner argued that service was proper since
the contract provided that the "Contractor shall have the option
to... settle the matter by arbitration in Mecklenburg County,
N.C. in accordance with the American Arbitration Association's
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, then in effect."91 The
AAA rule at the time further provided, "The AAA, the parties,
and the arbitrator may also use overnight delivery, electronic
facsimile (fax), telex, and telegram. Where all parties and the
arbitrator agree, notices may be transmitted by electronic mail
86 572 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that parties may use e-mail to transfer
notices where parties and arbitrator agree).
87 See Marolf Construction, 572 S.E.2d at 862-63 (explaining that service of process
via alternative means not explicitly permitted under state trial rules where parties had
expressly agreed in contract to be governed by procedural rules of the American
Arbitration Association).
88 See Marolf Construction, 572 S.E.2d at 862 (discussing various methods utilized
throughout the arbitration). See generally Clow Water Sys. Co. v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 411,
442-46 (1996) (discussing how facsimile communication during labor negotiations was
unacceptable method of communication where traditional method of communication was
by phone); Colby, supra note 15 (mentioning that courts have recently permitted
electronic service of process, including telex, fax, and e-mail).
89 See Marolf Construction, 572 S.E.2d at 862 (laying out respondent's arguments
that service of process given by facsimile was improper). See generally, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-567.6 (2001) (stating that notices of arbitration hearings must be served personally or
via registered mail); John M. McCabe, Uniformity in ADR: Thoughts on The Uniform
Arbitration Act and Uniform Mediation Act, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 358 (2003)
(discussing how notice of arbitration proceeding initiation is accomplished through
certified or registered mail).
90 N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-567.6 (2001); see also Marolf Construction, Inc., 572 S.E.2d. at
862 (finding Uniform Arbitration Act inapplicable due to agreement).
91 Marolf Construction, 572 S.E.2d at 861 (stating that contract had explicitly
provided for AAA's rules to govern case and thus service was proper).
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(E-mail), or other method of communication." 92 Looking at all of
this in sum, the court affirmed the trial court order that service
of process via the alternate means it was provided was proper
under the circumstances since the parties had consented to it.93
A third example of state courts speaking on the ability to serve
process by alternate, electronic means is in Modan v. Modan.94 In
this divorce case, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division noted that had the plaintiff told the court that he had
knowledge of an e-mail address, the trial court probably would
have allowed him to serve process on his defendant wife via that
e-mail address since she had moved back to Pakistan. 95 After a
short and unhappy marriage, plaintiff husband and his wife
separated, and the plaintiff brought his wife to her brother's
house in New York. 96 Plaintiff then tried to negotiate a property
settlement, but the defendant left the country for Pakistan and
the negotiations failed. 97 When the case was finally brought,
defendant's attorney refused to accept service for her client,
maintaining that it was necessary to serve her in Pakistan. 98
Plaintiff nonetheless tried to serve her with process at her
mother's New York address, but service was refused. 99 Plaintiff
contended that he believed this to be her address, but there was
sufficient evidence to show that he knew she had moved to
Pakistan, including phone calls and several e-mails made by
defendant to plaintiff from Pakistan.OO Plaintiff moved for and
92 Id. at 862-63 (noting that language of AAA rule allows delivery of notice by
alternative electronic means, notably e-mail, if both parties consent).
93 See id. at 863 (holding service of process through alternate means such as fax are
adequate where parties have given prior consent to such service). See generally Colby,
supra note 15 (noting how parties who consent to receiving service of process through
facsimile and e-mail have impliedly consented to being served through electronic means);
Goldsmith & Rinne, supra note 83, at 1080 n.118 (asserting that defendant may consent
to service of process by alternative methods than those enumerated within statutes).
94 742 A.2d 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding that service of notice could not be
served via e-mail).
95 See Modan, 742 A.2d at 613-14 (positing that if plaintiff had been forthright in his
diligent inquiry about e-mails with his wife, he would likely have been permitted to serve
notice of divorce suit through e-mail since publication of notice would not have fully
satisfied due process requirements).
96 See id. at 612 (reciting facts leading to difficulties plaintiff faced in effectuating
notice).
97 See id. (delineating problems which led to this action).
98 See id. (reviewing all events leading to attempts at service of process in question).
99 See id. (reviewing facts of rejected attempts at service).
100 See Modan, 742 A.2d 611, 611-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (noting that while
plaintiff may not have known defendant's exact address, he at least had knowledge of her
e-mail address from which he could communicate with her while she was in Pakistan).
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received an order from the trial court allowing notice by
publication, but without notifying the trial court of his awareness
of an e-mail address with which he could contact defendant.101
The appellate court overruled the trial court's order since it was
clear that the plaintiff did not use due diligence in finding
defendant's whereabouts since he had knowledge of his wife's e-
mail address. 102 The court further noted that the plaintiff should
have tried to serve process via e-mail as well as by publication to
satisfy due process requirements and more likely effectuate
notice. 103
D. Television
Before continuing on toward service of process via e-mail, it is
also worthwhile to note a case where service of process was
permitted by another modern means of communication:
television.104 In Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,105
plaintiffs brought an action in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York against defendants such as Osama bin
Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan for their alleged involvement in the disaster of
September 11, 2001.106 Due to the fact that the whereabouts of
101 See id. at 612 (pointing out that plaintiff was not forthright in his required
'diligent inquiry' to the court in his ability to communicate with defendant and that this
led to granting of plaintiffs motion for service via publication).
102 See id. at 613-14 (overruling trial court order which granted notice by publication
since it would have been much more likely to notify defendant of lawsuit if plaintiff had
used her e-mail address to follow up on her whereabouts).
103 See id. at 614 (positing that service of process via e-mail would have been proper
under these circumstances since it was method of service most likely to give defendant
notice of lawsuit).
104 See Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 01 Civ. 10132 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21712, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (permitting service by television); see also Chacker,
supra note 39, at 610 (describing Smith, where service was permitted to be served by
television on defendants with unknown addresses and whereabouts); Melissa Sepos, TV,
Newspaper Ads Will Be Used to Notify Bin Laden, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2002, at
3 (noting unusual methods of notification allowed to inform terrorists groups of civil suits
filed against them).
105 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
106 See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *1-2 (reviewing plaintiffs' reasons for
bringing action against noted parties); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 610-11 (giving
factual overview leading up to action brought against the alleged instigators of
September 11 attacks); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: State Jurisdiction and Immunities: Terrorist-State
Litigation in 2002-03, 97 AM. J. INVL L. 966, 972 (2003) (commenting that plaintiff was
successful in bringing suit against many different parties by presenting evidence of
responsibility which was found "satisfactory to the court").
2004] SERVICE OF PROCESS BYE-MALL
bin Laden or al Qaeda were unknown, service of process upon
these two defendants by traditional means would have been
futile.1 07 Because of this, the court authorized service of process
upon these two parties by a coupled method of newspaper
publication and television broadcast.ZO8 To fully satisfy due
process requirements, plaintiffs were also required to supplement
the publication notice with paid advertisements notifying
defendants of the pending lawsuits on the relevant broadcast
channels. 109 Further worth noting is that plaintiffs were not able
to serve process via television on the Taliban or the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, each of whom had readily ascertainable
addresses.110 Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, the courts
have allowed plaintiffs to effectuate service of process by unusual
methods not entertained at the time of Mullane.lll
107 See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *2-3 (outlining factors which caused
plaintiffs to move for service of process by alternate means under FED. R. OF CIV. P.
4(f)(3)); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 611 (showing challenges plaintiffs faced in
bringing their lawsuit against defendants); Sepos, supra note 104, at 3 (noting that
district court agreed that traditional methods of service, such as mail or personal delivery,
would not be feasible for bin Laden and al Qaeda, and thereby requiring alternative
means).
108 See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at "9-11 (listing reasons for allowing
process to be served upon bin Laden via publication); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at
611 (noting that court authorized such unusual methods of process because defendants'
whereabouts were unknown); Sepos, supra note 104, at 3 (recounting that notice of service
ran in HEWARD, ANIS, KABUL NEWS, and the KABUL TIMES in Afghanistan, in the
Pakistani paper WAIAT, and on several broadcast stations such as Al Jazeera, Turkish
CNN, and BBC World).
109 See Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 01 Civ. 10132 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21712, at *11 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (requiring plaintiffs to rely on more than just notice
by publication to properly effectuate service of process); see also Chacker, supra note 39 at
611 (noting that plaintiffs were required to pay for television advertisements); Sepos,
supra note 104, at 3 (stating that plaintiffs lawyer estimated cost of service using
television advertisements could be as much as $100,000).
110 See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *13-14 (requiring personal service of
process under Rule 4(f)(3) and not service by television upon Taliban and one of Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan's high ranking officials); see also Chacker, supra note 39 at 612
(discussing court's ruling that service by publication was not preferable upon defendants
such as Taliban and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan due to their known addresses);
Sepos, supra note 104, at 3 (noting how Taliban and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan were
personally served through Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan).
111 See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *9-10 (positing that Osama bin
Laden was aware civil suits would be filed against him after implementing plans to
destroy the World Trade Center and suspecting jurisdiction would be found within United
States due to state of disarray of Afghanistan's legal system); see also Chacker, supra note
39, at 610-12 (acknowledging unusual nature of method of service of process permitted
but nonetheless admitting its necessity to allow plaintiffs to have an opportunity for
recourse for their injuries). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 337-38 (discussing
Supreme Court's requirement, under Mullane, that service of process must be "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections").
92 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:1
IV. PARALLEL RULE DEVELOPMENTS
There have been parallel developments in the service of
documents via electronic means in both the federal and state
judiciary systems.112 The first support given to admitting
electronic submissions in federal court came in 1996,113 with the
amendments that introduced FEDERAL RULE OF CML
PROCEDURE 5(e)114  and FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 25(a)(2)(D).115 Both of these rules permit a court to
allow, by local rule, "papers to be filed, signed, or verified by
electronic means."116 The language in these rules has provided
the inspiration for rules providing for other electronic service.11 7
112 See Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L.
REV. 49, 58-59 (2003) (introducing methods of writing legal briefs for electronic context
with ancillary information regarding federal and state rules on filing papers
electronically). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 337-38 (arguing that electronic
service will develop into universal standard); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 252 (commenting
that service of process by electronic means may be superior to other methods because it is
virtually unhindered by physical restraint).
113 See Crist, supra note 112, at 58 (discussing initial rule changes which began to
allow electronic submissions to federal courts).
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e).
Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of papers with the court as required by
these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of court, except that the judge
may permit the papers to be filed with the judge, in which event the judge shall note
thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. A court
may by local rule permit papers to be filed, signed, or verified by electronic means
that are consistent with technical standards, if any, that the Judicial Conference of
the United States establishes, A paper filed by electronic means in compliance with a
local rule constitutes a written paper for the purpose of applying these rules. The
clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely
because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules
or practices.
See generally Crist, supra note 112, at 59 (stating that electronic submissions received
procedural support with the amendments to FED. R. CIv. P. 5(e) and FED. R. APP. P.
25(a)(2)(D)).
115 FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2)(D).
Electronic filing. A court of appeals may by local rule permit papers to be filed,
signed, or verified by electronic means that are consistent with technical standards, if
any, that the Judicial Conference of the United States establishes. A paper filed by
electronic means in compliance with a local rule constitutes a written paper for the
purpose of applying these rules.
See generally Crist, supra note 112, at 59 (stating that federal appellate rules were
amended to permit local courts to create rules aimed at increasing efficiency). Cf. Clint F.
Sare, CD-ROM Filings at Trial and Beyond, 1999 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 1, 3 (1999)
(noting that filings created on CD-ROM and use of electronic services may unfairly
prejudice parties without such technology).
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e); FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2)(D).
117 See Crist, supra note 112, at 58-59 (noting that electronic briefs are now admitted
in local courts pursuant to local rules). See generally JoEllen Lind, Civil Procedure: Recent
Developments in Civil Procedure, 35 IND. L. REV. 1157, 1236 (2002) (reviewing rule
changes allowing for electronic service in federal courts).
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For example, many federal circuits have adopted local rules for
the submission of electronic briefs, and some states even
mandate the submission of briefs by computer disk.118
Other rule changes have also been recently implemented. On
December 1, 2001, amendments to the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE were activated to allow parties to serve all pleadings
(except for complaints) and other papers via electronic means
where the party consents in writing. 119 RULE 5(b)(2)(D) permits
the service of these papers under RULE 5(a) by
Delivering a copy by any other means, including electronic
means, consented to in writing by the person served. Service
by electronic means is complete on transmission ... If
authorized by local rule, a party may make service under
this subparagraph (D) through the court's transmission
facilities.120
This rule was put into effect to ease the crippling effect that
paper has had on American courts in terms of maintaining
storage space, difficulty of judicial access, and costs of personnel
to manage and organize these papers.121 While parties are
required to consent to service under RULE 5(b)(2)(D), this
limitation is likely to recede as the courts begin to acknowledge
118 See, e.g., 1st CIR. LOC. R. 32(1) (declaring that parties represented by counsel must
submit one copy of their brief, petition for rehearing, and all papers exceeding ten pages
in length on a computer disk); 5th CIR. LOC. R. 31.1 (requiring parties to file one computer
readable diskette copy of brief with clerk); see also Crist, supra note 112, at n.58-59
(noting North Dakota Supreme Court's requirement that parties submit copies of briefs
on computer disk).
119 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(D) (allowing service of papers and filings to be made
upon parties electronically when written consent is given); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d),
Advisory Committee's Note (discussing amendments to Rule 5 in matters concerning
filing discovery requests). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 356 (noting relevance of
rule changes to service via e-mail).
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(D).
121 See Crist, supra note 112, at 51-55 (discussing factors which led to adoption of
electronic case management systems, including overflowing paperwork from courthouse
shelves and current ease judges and other officials now experience when accessing
filings); see also Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Electronic
Case Files in the Federal Courts: A Preliminary Examination of Goals, Issues, and the
Road Ahead (Discussion Draft 3) (Mar. 1997) available at http://www.uscourts.gov
casefiles/ecfmar97.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (listing problems with inability to store
paper filings and granting proper and complete access of papers to judges ); Bradley Hills,
Electronic Briefs in Trial and Appellate Courts (Apr. 2000) available at
http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/courttech3.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (mentioning
that filing briefs on CD-ROM takes up less physical space and represents easier format
for judges and clerks).
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the universal use and appeal of electronic communication. 122
Furthermore, the federal judiciary is working on implementing
these electronic case management systems nationwide. 123
Another point worth noting is that other rule changes have
been required to ensure that these rule changes survive a due
process scrutiny and meet the purpose of service of process. 124
These statutes include FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
26(c) 12 5 and FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 6(e),1 26 both of
which extend the time allowed to file an answer due to the
amendments made in the aforementioned rules.127 All of these
rule changes together seem to show a trend in the federal courts
122 See Colby, supra note 15, at n. 192 (predicting requirement that parties consent to
service of process via electronic means of communication will recede); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 5(b), Advisory Committee Notes (2001) (stating that "[elarly experience with electronic
filing as authorized by Rule 5(d) is positive, supporting service by electronic means as
well. Consent is required, however, because it is not yet possible to assume universal
entry into the world of electronic communication."). See generally Tamayo, supra note 25,
at 246-47 (discussing widespread popularity e-filing is gaining within courts).
123 See Colby, supra note 15, at n.194 (discussing plans for nationwide system of
electronic case management); see also Case Management / Electronic Case Files
CM/ECF, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf_about.html (last visited Aug.
24, 2004) (outlining plans for nationwide electronic case management and filing). See
generally Crist, supra note 112, at 50 (suggesting that all federal courts will use CMIECF
by 2005).
124 See, e.g., 5th CIR. LOC. R. 31.1 (requiring parties to serve each party separately
represented by counsel with disks); see also FED R. Civ. P. 5(b)(3), Advisory Committee
Note (2001) (recommending that person attempting service must try again if there is
actual knowledge that electronic service has failed). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at
n. 193 (referring to rules which have been adapted to ensure time limits for responding to
papers are fair under due process requirements).
125 FED. R. APP. P. 26(c). This statute provides that three (3) additional days are to be
added to the served party's response time when papers are served electronically when it
says:
When a party is required or permitted to act within a prescribed period after a paper
is served on that party, 3 calendar days are added to the prescribed period unless the
paper is delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service. For purposes of
this Rule 26(c), a paper that is served electronically is not treated as delivered on the
date of service stated in the proof of service.
See also Colby, supra note 15, at n. 194 for an analysis of various rule changes associated
with permitting service of papers electronically in certain situations.
126 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e). This rule provides for additional time to be added to the
answering period after service has been made under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D). It states:
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper
upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon the party under Rule 5(2)(B),
(C), or (D), 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Id. See also Lind, supra note 117, at 1236 for a review of various rule changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including permitting electronic service in federal courts.
127 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. (6)(e); FED. R. APP. P. (26)(c); see also Colby, supra note
15, at n.193 (discussing rule changes affecting electronic service); Lind, supra note 117, at
1236 (listing changes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other local rules).
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toward allowing electronic service more and more as technology
progress. 12s
There have also been similar movements in several state
judiciary systems toward increased use of technology in serving
process and other papers. 129 For example, the state of Indiana
has recently adopted new trial rules that allow the filing of
papers electronically.130  Indiana Trial Rule 5(E) gives a
definition of "filing with the court,"131 allowing the filing of
documents by all forms of electronic transmission, including
facsimile.132 This rule was enacted with the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act133 in mind which was designed to persuade
governmental entities to use electronic records.134
A steady progression can be seen in the evolution and
increased flexibility of service of process. 135 There has been a
constant development, from the need for personal service to
128 See Crist, supra note 112, at 55 (stating that "[als technology becomes pervasive
throughout society in general, it is understandable that the judiciary would expect similar
advancements in the courts"); see also Tamayo, supra note 25, at 248 (suggesting that
courts must progress as technology advances and will continue trend towards accepting
electronic documents). See generally Colby, supra note 15, at n.194 (noting potential
nationwide implementation of CM/ECF).
129 See, e.g., Crist, supra note 112, at n.59 (citing North Dakota district court
requirement that case briefs be filed with electronic supplements as well as paper
versions); see also Case Management / Electronic Case Files CM/ECF, available at
http://www.uscourts.govlcmecf/cmecfabout.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2004) (listing the
district and bankruptcy courts currently using or implementing CM/ECF). See generally
Colby, supra note 15, at 345-46 (noting effect increased use of e-mail has had on law in
terms of service of process).
130 See IND. TRIAL R. 5(F)(2) (allowing electronic filings of pleadings, motions and
other papers); see also Williams v. State of Indiana, 793 N.E.2d 1019, 1030 (2003)
(allowing attorneys to certify in filing papers that copies were sent via fax to Supreme
Court Administration office by fax or e-mail to other party's attorney). See generally Lind,
supra note 117, at 1227 (reviewing changes in Indiana's rules of civil procedure, including
provision allowing electronic service of filings).
131 IND. TRIALR. 5(E).
132 Id. (granting service of electronic filings by facsimile and all forms of electronic
transmission); see also Williams, 793 N.E.2d at 1030 (requiring papers be filed by fax).
See generally Lind, supra note 117, at 1227 (giving brief overview of modifications to
Indiana Trial Rules).
133 IND. CODE § 26-2-8.
134 See IND. CODE § 26-2-8 (encouraging local government to use electronic record
keeping systems); see also Lind, supra note 117, at 1227 (showing how Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act is complemented by amendment to Indiana Trial Rule 5(E)). See
generally Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1142-43 (2000) (outlining overview of Uniform Electronic Transactions Act).
135 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 604-15 (listing technological devices and means
through which courts have permitted service of process); see also Conley, supra note 3, at
417-24 (reviewing historical development of alternative forms of service of process). See
generally Tamayo, supra note 25, at 246-51 (discussing electronic technology and
litigation, including service of process).
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create a basis for a rigid form of personal jurisdiction to a more
flexible means of simply effectuating notice of a pending
lawsuit.136 Courts have also been more ambitious in recent years
in allowing plaintiffs to use new technologies to effectuate service
and have an opportunity to have their claims heard in court. 137
However, it can be clearly seen that this ambition has limits, and
that the service must still be the means most reasonably
calculated to reach defendants.138 Nonetheless, if the most
reasonably calculated method of best effectuating service
happens to be a facsimile or a television broadcast, we are likely
to see such service.139 An examination of service of process via e-
mail should thus fit the same standards.
V. SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA E-MAIL
A. Cases Rejecting E-Mail Service
There has been some resistance toward allowing service of
process electronically. 140 An example is seen in Columbia Ins. Co.
v. Seescandy.com. 141 In one of the first published decisions
136 See Colby, supra note 15, at 338-46 (discussing effect of changes in technology
and societal needs with expanding vision of service of process); see also Conley, supra note
3, at 417-20 (outlining historical rationale for service of process, from symbolic to
practical). See generally Tamayo, supra note 25, at 228-29 (explaining how service of
process is method by which court exercises physical power over defendant).
137 See supra PART III.
138 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(articulating constitutional standard of proper service as "reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections"); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 345
(noting that Mullane established standard by which all new forms of service of process are
to be evaluated). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice:
The Constitutionality of Service of Process by Posting After Greene v. Lindsey, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 601, 610-11 (1984) (highlighting facets of Mullane test).
139 See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220 (S.D.
N.Y. 2003) (allowing service on certain defendants, including Osama bin Laden, via
television broadcast); In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 717-22 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2000) (permitting service of process via facsimile); see also Chacker, supra note
39, at 609-12 (discussing In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs. and Smith decisions).
140 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (holding that e-mail service was not sufficient to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Wawa, Inc. v. Christensen, No. 99-1454, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510, at *1,
*4 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that e-mail service on defendants was not approved method
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 354-55 (listing
cases where service of process via e-mail and facsimile were not permitted).
141 185 F.R.D 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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addressing service of process by e-mail,14 2 the court refused to
allow service of process via e-mail.143 The case involved a
trademark dispute, and since defendants had registered for their
Internet domain name under pseudonyms, the plaintiff did not
have any idea whom to serve process.144 As a result, the plaintiff
named John Doe defendants and attempted to serve process via
e-mail, but received no response.145 The court rejected this
attempt at service as improper, but offered little to no reasoning
as to why it thought that service by e-mail did not comply with
the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE despite finding that
plaintiff had made a reasonable and good faith attempt to
identify defendants.14 6
The court in WAWA Inc. v. Christensen147 also refused to
permit service of process by e-mail.148 In that case, the plaintiff
attempted to serve process on a Danish citizen by e-mail and
142 See Colby, supra note 15, at 355 (noting that Columbia Ins. Co. was one of the
first published cases to address service of process by e-mail); see also Thumma & Jackson,
supra note 4, at 23 (citing several cases prior to Columbia Insurance Co. that had dealt
with electronic filing issues other than service of process). But see Tamayo, supra note 25,
at 250 (indicating that there were at least three other U.S. cases which had addressed
issue of service of process via e-mail).
143 See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579-81 (concluding that service of process
via e-mail was inadequate and that plaintiff needed to further investigate identity of
defendants); see also Colby, supra note 14, at 355 (restating Columbia Insurance Co.
holding that service of process by e-mail did not comport with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 250-51 (noting Columbia Insurance Co. court's
lack of explanation for decision).
144 See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 577 (stating defendants had registered
website domain under Internet aliases making it difficult for plaintiff to identify proper
defendants); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 355 (summarizing inability of plaintiff to
identify proper defendants); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 250-51 (noting plaintiff could only
find Internet pseudonyms under which defendants had registered their website).
145 See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 577-79 (observing that plaintiff sued
unknown defendants and attempted to serve them via e-mail); see also Colby, supra note
15, at 355 (restating plaintiffs efforts where he could not find identity of defendants);
Tamayo, supra note 25, at 251 (outlining plaintiffs efforts in trying to determine identity
of defendants).
146 See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(finding that service of process via e-mail was improper without explanation). See
generally Colby, supra note 15, at 355 (positing that insufficient explanation was given as
to why service via e-mail was held improper); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 251 (indicating
Columbia Insurance Co.'s holding that e-mail service was inadequate under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
147 No. 99-1454, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
148 See id. at *4 (pointing to discussion and recommendation by Judicial Conference
Rules Committee regarding possible rule change to FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 4 allowing for
service of process via e-mail); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 355-56 (examining
reasoning in WAWA, Inc.). But see Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007,
1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing WAWA, Inc.).
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regular mail.149 The court concluded that service by regular,
certified mail was proper but that service by e-mail was improper
without explanation, stating, "email [sic] is not a valid means for
delivering a summons and complaint to a defendant."150
However, it was not long after this case was decided that federal
courts began to allow plaintiffs to serve process on defendants via
e-mail.151
B. Cases Permitting E-Mail Services
The first federal case permitting service of process via e-mail
was In re Telemedia Associates, Inc.,152 as was described
above. 153 This case provided the first constitutional analysis of
the sufficiency of service by e-mail. 154 In making its decision, the
court noted that it was doing a sort of trailblazing,155 stating
"any unspecified form of alternate service usually has its genesis
in untried or formerly unapproved methodology."1 56 The court
thought was a logical extension of previous case law to allow
service by e-mail,157 stating that "[iut would be akin to hiding
149 See WAWA, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510 at *4 (stating plaintiff attempted to
serve defendant who was from Denmark via e-mail); see also In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs.,
Inc., 245 B.R. at 721, n.6 (distinguishing WAWA, Inc. on its facts); Colby, supra note 15, at
356 (examining facts and holding of WAWA, Inc.).
150 WAWA, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510, at *4 (holding e-mail service improper
since not explicitly permitted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Chacker,
supra note 39, at n.88 (summarizing holding of WAWA, Inc.); Colby, supra note 15, at 356
(examining WA WA, Inc. holding).
151 See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1018 (endorsing service of process by e-mail,
cognizant of medium's limitations); In re Int'l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R.713 at 720-
21 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (permitting service of process by e-mail). See generally Colby,
supra note 15, at 356 (discussing cases that allowed service of process via e-mail after
WA WA, Inc.).
152 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); see also Colby, supra note 14, at 356 (stating
that line of cases allowing service of process via e-mail began shortly after WAWA, Inc).
153 See supra PART III.B.
154 See In re Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 718-22 (finding no other United
States case considering notice via e-mail and holding that service of process via e-mail is
constitutionally proper); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 612-13 (highlighting In re
Telemedia Assocs., Inc. as first case where service of process via e-mail was found to be
constitutionally proper); Colby, supra note 15, at 356 (stating In re Telemedia Assocs., Inc.
was first case to analyze constitutionality of service of process via e-mail).
155 See In re Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 719 (recognizing the breaking of new
ground by allowing service of process by e-mail); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 358
(pointing to court's recognition that it was moving beyond prior case law and furthering
New England Merchants line of cases). See generally Chacker, supra note 39, at 612-13
(stating that In re Telemedia Assocs., Inc. was first case dealing with service by e-mail).
156 In re TelemediaAssocs., Inc., 245 B.R. at 719.
157 See id. at 722 (examining facts and finding that there was no reason not to allow
service of process via e-mail since defendant preferred to communicate with plaintiffs by
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one's head in the sand to ignore such realities and the positives of
such advancements."158 From all of this, it appears that the court
found that service of process via e-mail or facsimile can be
constitutionally permissible even where the defendant does not
expressly consent to service by such a manner. 159
Shortly after this case was decided, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided similarly
in Electronic Boutiques Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini.160 In this
case, service on the defendant was made difficult due to his
evasive behavior.161 Plaintiff argued that service via e-mail was
proper because the defendant preferred communication through
his e-mail address and thus sending notice via e-mail was likely
to produce notice of the lawsuit.162 The court allowed service via
e-mail here, dispelling any due process concerns by noting that
the e-mail service was allowed because it was defendant's
preferred means of communication.163
C. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink
A federal appellate court finally addressed the mounting
district court authority allowing service of process via electronic
or other new technological means in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio
International Interlink.164 Rio Properties was a Las Vegas casino
that method); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 358 (listing this case as logical extension of
cases allowing service of process by mail, publication, and facsimile). See generally
Chacker, supra note 39, at 610-11 (stating that as technology changes, so must law).
158 In re TelemediaAssocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
159 See id. at 722 (allowing e-mail service of process); see also Chacker, supra note 39,
at 613 (concluding that court decided e-mail service of process was constitutional). See
generally Colby, supra note 15, at 360 (discussing English High Court case where service
of process via e-mail was allowed where defendant had not consented to that method of
service).
160 No. 00-4055, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
161 See id. at *12-24 (observing that defendant made several maneuvers and
deceptions in order to evade service); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 613-14 (stating
that defendant was evasive and went out of his way to avoid service of process).
162 See Electronics Boutiques Holdings Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765 at *11-12
(mentioning that evasive defendant could be served by any means reasonably calculated
to notify him); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 614 (outlining plaintiffs argument that
service of process via e-mail would be proper upon this defendant).
163 See Electronics Boutiques Holdings Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765 at *11-13
(allowing service of process by alternative means); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 614
(referring to satisfaction of due process requirements where defendant preferred to
communicate by e-mail).
164 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 614 (noting Rio
Properties was first time issues of procedural due process and notice through modern
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owner and operator with various registered trademarks
protecting its rights in its casinos and other operations.165 Rio
Properties registered the website domain www.playrio.com to
advertise its renowned sports book and casino on the Internet.166
Rio International is a Costa Rican entity that operated an
Internet gambling business that earned approximately $3 million
annually.167  Rio International ran a website entitled
www.riosports.com and put advertisements in racing forms and
on the radio in Las Vegas as part of its marketing strategy.168
When Rio Properties learned of all of Rio International's actions,
they sent it a letter demanding it shut down the website.169
However, Rio International soon thereafter opened the website
www.betrio.com, causing Rio Properties to begin a suit for
trademark infringement.170 Rio Properties then tried to serve
process on Rio International, but discovered they were unable to
locate it in the United States or Costa Rica and were unable to
serve process through an international courier which Rio
International had set as their address upon registering the
websites.171 In response to these difficulties, Rio Properties filed
technology were tackled); Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 403 (stating Rio Properties was the
first time federal appellate court affirmed using e-mail to serve process).
165 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1012 (identifying plaintiff in lawsuit); see also
Chacker, supra note 39, at 614-15 (stating plaintiffs identity); Posey, Jr., supra note 64,
at 404 (discussing plaintiffs occupation).
166 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1012 (highlighting facts leading lawsuit); see also
Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 404 (noting how plaintiff registered domain name
'www.playrio.com'). See generally Chacker, supra note 39, at 614-15 (stating that plaintiff
was casino's owner).
167 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1012 (naming defendant and describing its
business); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 614-15 (identifying defendant as Costa
Rican Internet gambling business); Posey, Jr., supra note 64 at 404-05 (describing
defendant's business).
168 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1012 (observing Rio International's marketing
strategy for bringing visitors to its website was by implying an association with Rio
Properties); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 361 (discussing defendant's website); Posey,
Jr., supra note 64, at 404 (describing defendant's marketing strategy).
169 See Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002)
(remarking on Rio Properties' immediate reaction to Rio International's marketing
strategy); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 361 (discussing how plaintiff took immediate
action upon learning of Rio International's website); Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 405
(noting that plaintiff sent defendant cease-and-desist letter upon learning of defendant's
website).
170 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1012-13 (summarizing events which led to
lawsuit); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 361 (stating how defendant resumed its activity
on another website); Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 405 (discussing how defendant quickly
resumed its activities on another website).
171 See Rio Props. Inc., 294 F.3d at 1013 (indicating difficulties Rio Properties faced in
attempting to effectuate service upon Rio International); see also Colby, supra note 15, at
361 (discussing plaintiffs difficulty in serving defendant with process); Posey, Jr., supra
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an emergency motion for alternate service of process, and the
district court granted service via the e-mail address,
email@betrio.com, provided on Rio International's website.172
With the court order, Rio Properties served Rio International
and the court denied Rio International's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process. 173
Rio International then filed an answer, but failed to meet with
the court's discovery requirements, giving half-hearted and
useless answers to interrogatories and discovery requests.174 The
court finally granted preclusive sanctions on the defendant after
its bad faith in discovery.175 Rio International then appealed the
order challenging the sufficiency of service and jurisdiction.176
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order, holding that
service of process via e-mail satisfied due process
requirements. 177
In its analysis of whether service of process by e-mail was
proper, the Ninth Circuit first established the constitutional
framework under which to allow the service, derived from
Mullane, that notice be 'reasonably calculated' to reach the
parties to the lawsuit.178  They stated that, "this broad
constitutional principle unshackles the federal courts from
anachronistic methods of service and permits them entry into the
note 64, at 405 (noting how plaintiff was unable to serve process upon defendant in
traditional manner).
172 See Rio Props. Inc., 294 F.3d at 1013 (discussing district court's ruling that
ordered service of process via e-mail); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 361 (stating that
plaintiff was finally able to serve defendant via e-mail); Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 405-
06 (noting how court allowed plaintiff to serve defendant through e-mail).
173 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (recounting procedural
steps taken).
174 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d. at 1013 (mentioning Rio International's bad faith
conduct during discovery proceedings).
175 See Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int' Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting trial court's response to repeated bad faith activities of Rio International in
litigation, resulting in award of damages and attorney's fees to Rio Properties).
176 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d. at 1014 (following procedural stages of case).
177 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1016-19, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing and
disposing of case). See generally Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 404 (positing that e-mail and
Internet options do provide viable alternatives for expeditious and efficient service of
process).
178 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d. at 1016-19, 1023 (applying Mullane's 'reasonably
calculated' standard to this case to determine whether service of process via e-mail was
proper); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 618 (noting how Ninth Circuit applied
Mullane's 'reasonably calculated' standard); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950) (stating that notice must be 'reasonably calculated' to reach defendants in
order to be constitutional).
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technological renaissance." 179 The court then inquired as to
whether the e-mail service here had met this due process
threshold.180 Since Rio International set up a business model
where it could only be reached by e-mail,'18 the court concluded
that the 'reasonably calculated' standard was more than satisfied
since e-mailing service was the most likely method of effectuating
notice on defendant.182
However, the Ninth Circuit also recognized some of the
limitations of service by e-mail.x83 They listed three potential
problems with service by e-mail: confirming receipt of the e-mail
message, limited use of electronic signatures and verification
requirements, and attaching and viewing exhibits. 184 Because of
these concerns, the court called for trial courts to balance them
against the necessity of service by e-mail and the likelihood of the
notice to reach the defendant.I8 5
179 Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1017 (discussing technology's effect on world); see also
Colby, supra note 15, at 340 (announcing how proper service of process must exist for
courts to have authority over defendants). See generally Steve Meleen, Recent
Developments in Trademark Law: Elusive Dilution and Sorting the Resulting Confusion,
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 351, 412 (2003) (discussing service of process via e-mail).
180 See Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017-19 (9th Cir. 2002)
(demonstrating Ninth Circuit's application of 'reasonably calculated' standard to case).
181 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1017-18 (commenting that Rio International
made large profits and successfully set up its business to have its only means of
communicating with businessmen be by e-mail).
182 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that e-mail was
method most likely to reach defendant, which was only constitutional requirement); see
also Colby, supra note 15, at 363 (noting that court decided 'without hesitation' that e-
mail service met Mullane's 'reasonably calculated' standard); Chacker, supra note 39, at
619 (summarizing Ninth Circuit's holding that e-mail service satisfied Mullane's
'reasonably calculated' standard).
183 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1018 (recognizing some limitations in allowing
service of process to be effectuated by e-mail); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 364
(remarking on some limitations of service of process by e-mail listed by Ninth Circuit);
Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 412-14 (explaining identified and previously unidentified e-
mail limitations).
184 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1018 (listing some concerns and limitations on
service of process via e-mail); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 619 (enumerating Ninth
Circuit's ideas on limitations of service by e-mail); Colby, supra note 15, at 363-64
(debating Ninth Circuit's limitations and concerns about e-mail service).
185 See Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002)
(mandating that trial courts balance limitations on service of process via e-mail against
necessity of granting service of process by e-mail); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 619
(noting that trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant service by e-mail,
and that benefits of e-mail service should be balanced against limitations); Posey, Jr.,
supra note 64, at 407 (explaining need to balance limitations of e-mail service with its
benefits).
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D. Cases Following Rio Properties
Since the Ninth Circuit ruled permitting service of process by
e-mail, there have been several cases in both federal and state
courts where e-mail service has been permitted. 8 6 The United
States District Court for the Western District of New York spoke
on the subject in Ryan v. Brunswick Corp.187 In a personal
injury/products liability action, the plaintiff sued a New York
bicycle distributor and the Taiwanese component
manufacturer. 8 8 When the plaintiff had difficulty serving the
Taiwanese corporation by traditional means, the court moved sua
sponte in allowing plaintiff to serve process electronically.18 9 The
court relied on Rio Properties, noting that service can be
effectuated by "other means" where "not prohibited by
international agreement."190 However, the court also noted that
service by these other means could not be effectuated on the
whim of the plaintiff.191 They found that reasonable attempts at
service must be made before electronic service can be
effectuated.192 And while they "need not exhaust all possible
186 See, e.g., Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-133(E) F, 2002 WL 1628933, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding service of process via e-mail as proper upon Taiwanese
corporation); Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 2002)
(permitting wife to serve her husband divorce papers via e-mail after he had tried to
evade service by hiding in Saudi Arabia); see also Snead v. Snead, No. 2020052, Ala. Civ.
App. LEXIS 412, at *1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (finding Rio Properties persuasive and that
alternate forms of service may be used under Alabama state procedural rules where
defendant evades service).
187 Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-133(E) F, 2002 WL 1628933, *1 (W.D. N.Y. 2002).
188 See id. at *1 (naming plaintiff, defendant, and cause of action leading to
procedural question at issue).
189 See id. at *1, *1-3 (reviewing court's actions and reasons for allowing e-mail
service of process); see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 626 (noting how other courts,
outside Ninth Circuit, have cited to Rio Properties); Colby, supra note 15, at 365
(concluding that Ryan court held that parties could not whimsically seek to use other
means of service).
190 Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933 at *2 (citing Rio Properties on premise that Rule 4(0(3)
provides basis for serving process by electronic means); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(0(3)
(allowing service by any means not prohibited by international agreement); Rio Props.,
Inc. 284 F.3d at 1014-19 (holding that service of process via e-mail was proper under Rule
4(f)(3) where due process required).
191 See Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-133(E) F, 2002 WL 1628933, at *1, *2 (W.D.
N.Y. 2002) (placing limitations on when electronic service of process may be authorized);
see also Chacker, supra note 39, at 626 (debating Rio Props. Inc.'s applications beyond
electronic mail); Colby, supra note 15, at 363 (restating to Ryan court that plaintiffs
cannot "whimsically" seek to use electronic service of process).
192 See Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *6-9 (requiring reasonable attempts at
traditional methods of service to be made before alternate methods of service can be
sought); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 363 (mentioning requirement that traditional
service be attempted first before alternate service may be authorized). See generally
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methods of service," it must be a situation where the "court's
intervention is necessary to obviate the need to undertake
methods of service that are unduly burdensome or that are
untried but likely futile."193 The court in Ryan expanded on the
holding in Rio Properties, finding that the degree of evasiveness
need not be as extreme to authorize electronic service.194
A state court in New York also spoke on the issue of whether
service of process via e-mail can be permitted in Hollow v.
Hollow. 195 In this divorce case, the plaintiffs husband moved to
Saudi Arabia to work for an engineering firm.196 The defendant
then proceeded to e-mail his wife, and taunted her by insinuating
that he was untouchable since he was in Saudi Arabia.197 The
plaintiff then brought her divorce suit but was unable to
personally serve defendant in Saudi Arabia.198  Therefore,
plaintiff sought an order authorizing service of process by e-mail
and an extension of time to serve process.199 The court
authorized service of process via e-mail, citing Rio Properties and
Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 410 (suggesting that alternative service of process was
generally either accepted or denied based in part on attempt in effectuating service of
process upon defendant).
193 Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933 at *2 (elaborating as to where service of process by
alternate methods can be properly effectuated); see Colby, supra note 15, at 366
(explaining court's holding as expanding upon Rio Properties); see also Wright & Miller,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1134 (1990) (referring to Rule 4(f)(3) as
tailored to fit circumstances to permit what due process requires).
194 See Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933 at *3 (authorizing appropriate means of service of
process even though defendant was not as "elusive" as defendant in Rio Properties.); see
also Rio Props Inc., Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002) (articulating that
in proper circumstances, service of process reasonably calculated to provide constitutional
requirements of notice and opportunity to respond may include court decision to enter
"into the technological renaissance"); Colby, supra note 15, at 366 (noting that "degree of
rascality" present in Rio Properties need not be present to authorize service of process by
electronic means under Rule 4(f)(3)).
195 747 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 2002).
196 See id. at 705 (reviewing facts that eventually led to inability to serve defendant
by traditional methods of service).
197 See id. (quoting defendant as saying "I am a resident of Saudi Arabia and there's
nothing anyone can do to me here.").
198 See id. (noting that personal service was nearly impossible because defendant
resided on a company-owned compound and that other traditional methods of service,
such as letters, would have been far too expensive for relative value of divorce claim); see
also Greene v. Lindsay, 456 U.S. 444, 454 (1982) (indicating that reasonableness of notice
to be chosen must be measured with reference to viable existing traditional alternatives).
See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 367-69 (discussing reasons why traditional means
of service can be highly impractical).
199 See Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 2002)
(restating motions under which case was brought).
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In re International Telemedia Associates in the process.200
Despite recognition of the concerns about e-mail service listed in
Rio Properties, the court found that e-mail service of process here
was constitutionally adequate because the service was
'reasonably calculated' to reach the defendant. 20' The court
officially authorized the plaintiff to serve defendant notice to his
last known e-mail address and by registered mail.202
E. Authorizing E-Mail Service
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3)
RULE 4(f)(3) was designed to be a "catch-all" to permit service
of process by means that are not listed explicitly in the FEDERAL
RULES.203 It states that service of process on an individual in a
foreign country may be effectuated "by other means not
prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the
court."204 The court used plain language analysis and found that
service must thus not be prohibited by an international
agreement and must be directed by the court.205 The court in Rio
Properties further stated that service authorized under RULE
4(f)(3) has an equal legal basis as does any service under RULE
200 See id. at 706-08 (pointing to federal precedent in finding authority allowing
service of process via e-mail). See generally Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-133(E) F, 2002
WL 1628933, at *1, *9 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (affirming that any alternative, court-approved
methods must comport with due process requirements and that it is constitutionally
permissible to authorize service via e-mail); Colby, supra note 15, at 369 (discussing
rationale under which New York Supreme Court found e-mail service proper).
201 See Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (permitting service of process by e-mail since it
was method of service which most likely would reach defendant); see also Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating that notice must be 'reasonably
calculated' to reach defendants in order for it to be constitutional); Colby, supra note 15,
at 369 (reviewing rationale under which court in Hollow allowed service via e-mail).
202 See Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (specifying court-ordered methods of service
plaintiff was allowed utilize).
203 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (allowing service of process by any means so long as
directed by court); see also Philip A. Buhler, Transnational Service of Process and
Discovery in Federal Court Proceedings: An Overview, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 15 (2002)
(describing Rule 4(f)(3) as catch-all for determining by what method service may be
effectuated). But see Posey, Jr. supra note 64, at 407-08 (arguing that e-mail is not
permissible alternative method of service under RULE 4(0(3)).
204 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
205 See id; see also Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining
applicability of Rule 4(f)(3) on service of process by e-mail); Ryan v. Brunswick, 2002 WL
1628933, at *1, *9 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (articulating that Court may authorize alternative
means of service as long as they are directed by court and not forbidden by international
agreement).
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4(f)(1)206 or RULE 4(f)(2).207 Under the RULES, Congress further
granted the trial court the discretion to determine when the facts
of the case require alternate methods of service of process under
RULE 4(f)(3).208
2. International Agreements
One of the requirements of RULE 4(f)(3) is that the means of
effectuating service not be prohibited by international
agreement. 209 RULE 4(f)(1) specifically mentions the Hague
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents 210 as one of these international agreements. 211 The
Supreme Court has said that the Hague Service Convention is
the primary means of effecting service internationally, and that
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1) (authorizing effecting of service of process by any
internationally agreed upon means meeting due process standards). See generally Prewitt
Enters. v. OPEC, 353 F.3d 916, 921 (lth Cir. 2003) (averring that Rule 4(f) is rule of
federal civil procedure that applies to international entities located outside of United
States): Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933 at *2-3 (showing applicability of Rule 4(f) when foreign
country is not party to Hague Convention or any other relevant international agreement
reasonably calculated to give notice of service).
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2) (permitting service of process to be effected by means
granted under foreign law as long as it meets due process requirements); see also Rio
Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1015-16 (stating that Rule 4(f) was not intended as last resort
means of service, but rather equal means of effectuating service); Buhler, supra note 203,
at 15 (describing scope and applicability of Rule 4(f)(2)).
208 See Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d at 1016 (stating that whether service of process can
be effectuated is to be determined by facts on case-by-case basis); see also Prewitt Enters.,
353 F.3d at 921 (determining that plain language of Rule 4(0(3) permits court to direct
alternative means of service after reviewing circumstances of specific case).
209 See FED. R. CrV. P. 4(0(3) (permitting service "by other means not prohibited by
international agreement as may be directed by the court."). See generally Prewitt Enters.,
353 F.3d at 921 (averring that Rule 4(f) applies to international entities located outside of
the United States); Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2-3 (showing applicability of Rule 4(0
when foreign country is not party to Hague Convention or any other relevant
international agreement reasonably calculated to give notice of service).
210 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1) (setting forth procedures for service of summons and
complaint on foreign defendants); see also Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20
U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention] (exemplifying reasonable standards of
giving notice); Colby, supra note 15, at 350-51 (stating that "[s]o long as the authorized
method of service is not prohibited by international agreement, it need not comply with
foreign law.").
211 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1) (citing Hague Service Convention as example of relevant
international agreement on procedure); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 353 (explaining
that "the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory is another relevant
international agreement" in service procedure). See generally Anne-Marie Kim, Note, The
Inter-American Convention and Additional Protocol on Letters Rogatory: The Hague
Service Convention's "Country Cousins'?, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687, 689 (1998)
(clarifying that business relationships between United States and Latin American
countries create need for international agreements on service of process and service of
documents).
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it is mandatory where it does apply. 21 2 As the Hague Service
Convention was adopted almost 40 years ago, it does not
expressly confirm or deny the ability to use electronic media such
as e-mail, the Internet, or facsimile, to effectuate notice. 21 3
However, "if its letter is to be interpreted alongside its general
spirit, as well as according to generally accepted definitions,
Article 1 will most likely permit service upon electronic
addresses".214
3. Public Policy
The court in Rio Properties noted that "when faced with an
international e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the
federal court, email may be the only means of effecting service of
process."21 5 Indeed "service of process is not a game of hide and
seek" but defendants can often be surprisingly evasive when it
comes to avoiding courts. 216 Paraphrasing what was stated
212 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988)
(noting that Supreme Court has found Hague Service Convention to be primary tool used
in serving process on defendants abroad); see also Colby, supra note 15, at 351
(emphasizing that courts can reference Hague Service Convention in determining
whether to permit electronic service of process); Kim, supra note 211, at 689 (agreeing
that Hague Service Convention is used often with cases involving transnational
litigation).
213 See Colby, supra note 15, at 351 (predicating "[t]he Hague Convention neither
explicitly authorizes nor explicitly prohibits service of process by e-mail."); see also
Conley, supra note 3, at 413-14 (affirming that Hague Service Convention does not
expressly state service of process via e-mail is proper); Charles T. Kotuby, Jr., The Hague
Convention on Service and Evidence and Their Applicability to Internet-Related
Litigation, 20 J.L. & COM. 103, 111 (2000) (positing that dated nature of Hague Service
Convention precludes any possibility that there would be express permission allowing
electronic service of process but that spirit of agreement would allow electronic service
where it was best method of service available).
214 Kotuby, supra note 213, at 114.
215 Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
216 See Electronics Boutique, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765, at *1, *29 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
This concept of defendants being difficult to locate can be seen from the deposition of the
defendant Zuccarini, who abandoned his residence to avoid service of process. The
following took place at deposition:
Q. 957 Bristol Pike is not your residence?
A. No, it's not. It's my legal address. I have a lease on the apartment and that's
where I have - some things are sent there which I get.
Q. Do you intend to live [at the Andalusia address] in the future?
A. I don't think so, no. I don't think I will.
Q. Then it presumably is not your legal address.
A. It's my legal address. I don't have an address. If I don't live in one permanent
place, you know, I can't - if I move somewhere different every week, I can't
change my address every week on all my credentials. That's a lease I have an
apartment on, that's where my tax returns are filed. It's the address I use.
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earlier in New England Merchants, as technology grows, courts
should not be afraid to use this technology where defendants are
hiding from service. 217 Service of process by e-mail can be a
valuable tool in keeping scofflaws from hiding behind their
computers and force them to have their day in court. 218
Currently, courts have held that service of process can be
effectuated by e-mail where foreign defendants are evasive. 2 19
However, one commentator has suggested that electronic service
be permitted in domestic cases. 220 While noting the ongoing
evolution that modern service of process has and is
undertaking, 221 Colby urges that RULES 4(e) and 4(h) should be
Q. Do you receive mail there?
A. At that address, no. I receive - no. If it goes to that address, I won't get it.
Q. Because it is -
A. I'm not there.
Q. So the mail is not delivered?
A. Lots of times, yes.
Q. How do you receive mail?
A. Some mail is forwarded?
Q. To where is it forwarded?
A. There is a post office box in Bensalem, Pennsylvania.
Q. Do you have the post office box?
A. Do I have the post office box?
Q. Yes. Can you say what the post office box is?
A. Yes. 1088 Bensalem, Pennsylvania.
Dennis Maxim, Inc. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-2104 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also Chacker, supra
note 39, at 597 n.4 (noting difficulty in ascertaining whereabouts of evasive defendants).
217 See e.g., New England Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(believing that courts should be open to electronic service where defendants attempt to
evade service); Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (concluding that
traditional means of service may not work with defendants evading service). See generally
Colby, supra note 15, at 364 (arguing that courts should accept alternative means of
service of process when defendants are difficult to find).
218 See Rio Props Inc., 284 F.3d at 1018 (asserting that e-mail may be only means of
effectuating service of process in response to challenges of digital age); see also Colby,
supra note 14, at 381-82 (concluding that courts must adapt to electronic age in same way
public has embraced it). See generally Tamayo, supra note 25, at 246-52 (explaining
increased use of e-mail in litigation process).
219 See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing e-mail
service on evasive foreign defendant). But see Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,185
F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding e-mail service of process not appropriate). See
generally Tamayo, supra note 25, at 252-54 (predicting future use of e-mail service of
process).
220 See Colby, supra note 15, at 372-82 (arguing that service of process be permitted
in certain domestic cases). See generally Kotuby, supra note 213, at 111 (hinting at
necessity of electronic service as technology changes); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 256
(positing need for service of process via e-mail).
221 See Colby, supra note 15, at 373 (summarizing evolution of service of process and
arguing it is still evolving with modern technology); see also Kotuby, supra note 213, at
111 (pondering adjusting service of process techniques because of technological advances).
See generally; Tamayo, supra note 25, at 248 (recognizing courts must be aware of
changes and advances in technology and to apply such technology in service of process).
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amended to allow service of documents by e-mail and fax where
the court directs. 222 He also argues that there is no need to
differentiate between an evasive defendant in or out of the
country. 223 However, this argument assumes that the costs of
serving plaintiffs abroad and domestically are similar.224 Colby
also argues that e-mail could be used to serve waivers and
subpoenas with greater ease. 225 Overall, Colby argues that
service of process by e-mail is an evolving concept that should be
expanded. 226
Orders permitting expanded electronic service may leave a
troublesome legacy. 227 In particular, the court in Rio Properties
failed to take into account the deficiencies of a new technology in
their broadly-outlined balancing test.228 They also did not
mention whether complementary forms of notice are required
222 See Colby, supra note 15, at 376 (reviewing over proposed amendments to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that would allow service of documents by e-mail or fax). See
generally Conley, supra note 3, at 414 (noticing that Hague Service Convention does not
textually prohibit service of process by e-mail or fax); Kotuby, supra note 213, at 111
(establishing need to discuss service in regards to technology advancement).
223 See, e.g. Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming e-mail
service of process on evasive defendants); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112
F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2000) (permitting service by e-mail on domestic defendant);
see also Colby, supra note 15, at 377 (arguing for electronic service of process in domestic
cases).
224 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John
Bunyan's Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1534 (expressing possible costs of civil
litigation); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of
Serving Process Under Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.163 (1987) (stating mail
service can cost as little to less than one percent of costs of regular service); Tamayo,
supra note 25, at 256 (noting that Rule 4 proposes fee shifting proposal which would be
superfluous because of waiver rules).
225 See Colby, supra note 15, at 378-79 (furthering argument that electronic service
should evolve to allow more documents and judicial orders to be served). See generally
Kotuby, supra note 213, at 120 (mentioning purpose of Hague Service Convention was to
simplify and expedite service procedures); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 252 (assuring e-mail
is more reliable tool).
226 See Colby, supra note 15, at 378-79 (arguing that service of process via e-mail
should be expanded). See generally Conley, supra note 3, at 414 (noting that application of
Hague Service Convention may broaden in future); Tamayo, supra note 25, at 252-53
(arguing e-mail could revolutionize service of process).
227 See Chacker, supra note 39, at 623-24 (positing that district courts could have
problems with lack of clearly defined standards in Rio Properties holding); see also Rio
Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1007 (failing to provide clear test for subsequent courts to follow).
See generally Colby, supra note 15, at 364 (interpreting standard set out in Rio
Properties).
228 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d 1007, 1018-1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (neglecting to
elaborate on balancing test). See generally Chacker, supra note 39, at 624 (noting
problems with holding in Rio Properties); Posey, Jr., supra note 64, at 408 (arguing Rio
Properties did not set out any standard with specificity).
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when sending service of process via e-mail. 229 Any court looking
to expand service by e-mail should be careful to keep within the
standard outlined in Mullane to ensure that justice is being
achieved and that the service will best achieve notice of a
lawsuit. Consent has played a large part in the evolution of
electronic service, and it must be remembered that service via e-
mail, while potentially useful where defendants are evasive, is
also risky where circumstances do not show it to be worthwhile.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a clear evolution of service of process, from the
days where personal service in the forum was required, to service
by publication, mail, telex, facsimile, and now e-mail. Service by
e-mail has been directed by the courts where foreign defendants
have tried to evade service of process and avoid their day in
court. It may be wise to enact statutory language to shore up the
limits of this type of service. Precedent has shown that courts
are uneasy about allowing service of process by e-mail, and
indeed, this type of service should be allowed, but only where the
courts have directed it and as an alternate means of service
where traditional means of service have failed at bringing about
justice. This should be enough to let defendants know that they
cannot hide behind their computers and avoid service of process.
229 See Rio Props. Inc., 284 F.3d at 1018-19 (failing to clarify components of
balancing test used). See generally Chacker, supra note 39, at 624 (listing some problems
that exist for courts in determining whether electronic service should be permissible);
Posey, Jr. supra note 64, at 408 (claiming Rio Props Inc. sets poor precedent).
